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Introduction 
Scholars have noted a rise in the adoption of Islamic laws in Muslim-majority countries that 
have begun to develop their democracies.1 Subsequent studies have examined the causes and 
consequences of this rise. Very broadly, these studies – few of which are based on 
detailed empirical analysis of the passage of laws – fall in to two camps. The first explains 
the passage of Islamic laws as ideologically driven. Once elected, politicians seek to use their 
power to impose shari’a law on a larger number of people and across a wider range of social 
and economic areas. In other words, shari’a law is supply driven.2 The second body of liter- 
ature sees the passage of shari’a laws as a response of politicians to the demands or perceived 
preferences of their constituents, who may be voters or power brokers.3 In this case, shari’a 
law is seen as demand driven. 
In reality, the supply and demand side interact in Islamist politics just as they do in secular 
economics. We  have  thus  attempted  to  develop  a  framework  which  allows  for  a more 
nuanced investigation of the motivation for passage of shari’a laws. This „alignment of Interest‟ 
framework predicts variations in content and in the geographical and temporal distribution 
of newly-adopted shari’a laws, according to the major motivation for their pas- sage. We then 
test this framework against an original database of regulations passed in Indonesia, the 
world‟s largest Muslim-majority democracy, between 1999 and   2012. 
 
1. Framework and hypotheses 
Taking the discussion in the existing literature as a starting point, we posit that there are 
two broad motivations for democratically-elected politicians to adopt shari’a laws and reg- 
ulations: ideological conviction on the one hand and response to the expressed or perceived 
preference of constituents on the other hand. The„demand side‟ can be further divided into the 
preferences of individual voters, and the interests of groups which act as power brokers, 
influencing the voting choices of individual citizens. These groups may be economic, reli- 
gious, or other actors. 
These motivations are not mutually exclusive; the passage of a given shari’a regulation 
may fulfil two or all three of them simultaneously. However, we posit that the interaction 
between the place, timing, and content of shari’a laws passed in a nation as a whole will vary in 
various predictable ways, according to the dominant motivations. The dominant motiva- tion 
may also affect the vigour with which the law is   implemented. 
Shari’a laws can be enacted in many different areas of life, including religious observance, 
dress, family relations, marriage, finance, and much else.4 We believe that the content of the 
law may vary by motivation, with demand side laws being broadly more populist in nature 
than those enacted out of pure religious conviction. In democracies, law-making is embed- 
ded in a relatively predictable electoral cycle. The time during that electoral cycle in which a 
law is proposed or enacted is likely to be influenced by law-makers‟ reasons for proposing the 
law. In the case of demand-driven laws, campaign periods may produce different types of 
regulations compared with periods in which an incumbent can no longer run for re-elec- tion 
for example. Geographical variation is highly country-specific. In any given Muslim- 
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majority democracy, we expect areas with a long culture of involvement in political Islam 
to produce more shari’a regulation on the demand side, but not necessarily on the supply 
side. In some countries, laws and regulations are passed with much greater frequency than 
they are implemented. We believe variations in implementation of shari’a regulations may 
provide some clues to the motivation for their  passage. 
Our framework delineates three broad constellations of these variables. The content, 
timing, geographical distribution, and implementation of shari’a regulations in each con- 
stellation interact in predictable ways, and each maps on to a dominant motivation. 
 
 
Pattern 1: supply side motivation; religious ideology 
Politicians motivated principally by religious ideology are least influenced by the preference 
of the electorate. We would expect the laws they pass to encompass all aspects of religious 
doctrine equally, and we would expect those laws to be passed either with no discernible 
regard for the electoral cycle, or shortly after initial election when they first have the oppor- 
tunity to extend their ideologies to others through the force of law. In decentralised systems, we 
would also expect these regulations to be distributed relatively evenly across a nation. 
 
Table 1. alignment of interests: hypothesised patterns in passage of shari’a laws, for different primary 
motivations. 
 
Pattern Content Timing Geographical  distribution Implementation 
ideologically 
driven 
Broad on election/low 
variation 
universal universal 
appeal to voters Popular/ 
Populist 
Campaign periods highly variable When re-
electable 
appeal to 
power 
brokers 
delivering 
to 
interests 
low variation Variable universal 
 
In addition, we expect that politicians who pass laws out of ideological conviction are likely to 
make significant efforts to see those laws  implemented. 
 
Pattern 2: demand side motivation; direct appeal to voters 
In contrast, elected politicians who pass laws with the intention of supporting their own 
re-election are clearly interested in appealing to voters. When that appeal is direct – to 
individual voters – we would expect the regulations to focus on those aspects of religious 
law deemed to be popular or even populist, and for the passage of laws to cluster in cam- 
paign periods. Where there are strong regional variations in voter preferences, we would 
expect those to be reflected in the passage of regulations. In terms of implementation, we 
would expect it to be more forceful in periods when an incumbent has a chance of being 
re-elected than when they do  not. 
 
Pattern 3: demand side motivation; appeal to power brokers 
Politicians intent on appealing to power brokers will choose areas of religious law that meet 
the needs of those various interest groups. Because patronage relationships involve mutually 
beneficial ties that are developed and can persist over many election cycles5 we would expect 
less temporal variation in the passage of laws that appeal to this group. Geographically, we 
would expect less of a variation in volume than seen in laws designed to appeal directly to 
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voters. However, variations in the specific content of patronage-conferring laws are possible, 
with those appealing to religious brokers more common in more strongly Islamic areas. To 
be effective, patronage must be delivered, so we would expect implementation rates to be 
high. 
These variations are summarised in Table 1. 
Though this characterisation is simple, we believe that it might provide a useful starting 
point for disentangling the motivations for of the passage of shari’a laws in different countries 
and different electoral systems. While the passage of any given law may have overlapping 
motivations, the analysis of patterns in the passage of laws at a national level may reveal 
that some patterns predominate in a given country or at a given time period, thus revealing 
differences between regions or over time. 
as a starting point, we try to the extent possible to validate this framework using data 
from Indonesia, the world‟s largest Muslim democracy, and one that has been enthusiastically 
passing local regulations for a decade and a  half. 
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2. Background to the data-set: democratisation, decentralisation and 
law- making in Indonesia 
For over half of its 71-year existence, Indonesia was ruled from the capital Jakarta, with no 
real participation from the electorate. The heads of provinces, districts and municipalities 
were appointed by the central government and implemented their programmes with little 
variation.6 They had little incentive to respond to the needs or desires of citizens. after the 
collapse of the new Order regime in 1998, Indonesia‟s national government adopted free 
multi-party elections. Since 1999, the country has held free and fair elections every five years, 
contested by as many parties as meet the registration criteria. 
at the same time as Indonesia was re-establishing multi-party elections after decades of 
authoritarian rule, it embarked on a radical programme of decentralisation. From 2001, in 
recognition of Indonesia‟s extraordinary ethnic, cultural, and economic diversity, districts 
(and to a lesser extent provinces) acquired unprecedented powers to make decisions locally. 
Policy and spending decisions about health, education, industry, and many other areas of 
life are made by district governments, consisting of an executive and a legislative branch. 
Since 2005, district heads and provincial governors have been directly elected by the local 
citizenry. at the time of writing, local government heads could be elected for up to two 
five-year terms. If they wish to run for office after completing two terms, they must seek 
office at a different level. 
Indonesia remains a multi-faith state and all citizens are encouraged to list one of six 
religions on their identity card: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or 
Confucianism. Some 87% of Indonesians profess Islam, but there are important regional 
variations. In aceh province, which describes itself with pride as„the Veranda of Mecca‟, 98.2% 
of residents reported being Muslim in the 2010 census, compared with just 66.1% in neigh- 
bouring north Sumatra, which has a large Protestant community. In Bali (predominantly 
Hindu) and large swathes of Eastern Indonesia (with Christian majorities) less than a third 
of Indonesians are Muslim.7 among the Muslim-majority regions, some areas have stronger 
historical links with Islamist movements than others. In the 1950s and early 1960s, rebels 
hoping to establish a pan-Indonesian Islamic state were active in aceh, West Sumatra, the 
western part of Java, South Sulawesi, and South  Kalimantan. 
religious affairs were one of the areas that were retained under the authority of the central 
government under law 22/1999 governing local government. Because of this, and because 
Indonesia is constitutionally a multi-faith nation, provinces and districts are not allowed to 
issue shari’a or other religious regulations. aceh province is an exception. In an effort to 
reduce support for a separatist insurgency by according the province special privileges, the 
Indonesian government has since 2001 allowed aceh to pass shari’a regulations. 
although subnational jurisdictions must operate within the legal framework of the unitary 
state, in order to meet local needs local governments are permitted to pass local regulations 
that complement national laws. Several jurisdictions have used this loophole to adopt local 
regulations and executive orders8 on issues that are derived exclusively from Islamic teach- 
ings. Concretely, local regulations have been adopted on dress codes for Muslims and obli- 
gations to pay religious alms. In addition, many districts have passed laws that stress public 
morality – prohibitions on alcohol and prostitution, for example – that are generally inspired 
by religious teachings and enabled by a climate of conservatism but that may not be 
enshrined exclusively in Islam. We recognise that in the Indonesian legal context none of 
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these regulations may technically be termed „shari’a regulations‟, except in aceh province. 
However, we use the term in this article for convenience, to avoid repetition of the clumsier 
phrase„Islam-inspired regulations‟. It is these laws, described at greater length in the methods 
section below, which are collected in our validation  data-set. 
 
3. Validating the ‘alignment of interests’ framework for Indonesia 
The conflicting views characterising the broader debate on what causes the rise of shari’a 
laws in democratising Muslim-majority countries are reflected to some extent in the schol- 
arship on the adoption of shari’a regulations in democratising   Indonesia. 
a few anthropologists and other scholars, some drawing observations from a single 
sub-district, have interpreted the adoption of shari’a regulations as an indication that Islamist 
ideologies are making inroads into Indonesian politics.9 This view has certainly been reflected 
in public discourse: a typical example is provided by a New York Times article entitled 
„Extremism Spreads across Indonesian Penal Code‟.10 
The majority view, on the other hand, is that Islamist parties and interest groups are a 
very long way from setting the political agenda in Indonesia. Several studies suggest that 
in adopting shari’a regulations, politicians are primarily thinking not about religious ideology 
but about their re-electability. The adoption of shari’a regulations has been attributed to 
growing pressure on Indonesian politicians with a hitherto secular outlook to mobilise the 
masses.11 Other studies have said that it is a clumsy way for politicians to signal to a newly 
empowered electorate that they take the rule of law seriously.12 Some scholars see it as an 
expression of sub-national jurisdictions‟more assertive stance vis-à-vis the national govern- 
ment.13 Finally, some studies have said that the adoption of shari’a regulations is to be seen 
as a sign of outright political corruption and rent-seeking as shari’a regulations allow poli- 
ticians to control the collection (and distribution) of religious   alms.14 
Political party affiliations remain weak in Indonesia – politicians often switch parties even 
when they are at the level of vice president or cabinet minister – so politicians work hard to 
project their own personalities and to build up personal support networks.15 a handful of 
„democratic entrepreneurs‟have emerged; politicians who focus their energies on delivering 
benefits directly to the electorate.16 More commonly, however, candidates for governor and 
district head promise many benefits to voters, but actually deliver most benefits to influential 
individuals or groups who may be able to rally blocks of votes.17 The Indonesian media 
commonly uses the English phrase„money-politics‟ to describe the undertow of patronage 
and clientelism that characterise these local elections, and scholars have recently begun to 
investigate more rigorously the mechanisms through which such patronage operates.18 
networks identified as potentially providing support for candidates include religious leaders 
with significant congregations (especially in rural areas), and vigilante groups, including 
those which rally under Islamist  banners. 
applying the„alignment of Interest‟ framework above to a data-set of shari’a regulations 
passed in Indonesia, we would thus expect to find very limited evidence of purely ideological 
motivation (little sign of Pattern 1), strong evidence of appeal to power brokers (significant 
presence of Pattern 3), and moderate evidence of appeal direct to the electorate (some 
presence of Pattern 2). 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to try to analyse empirically the interaction 
between the content of shari’a laws and the timing and distribution of their passage and 
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implementation in a large Muslim-majority democracy. We hope it will yield insights into 
ways of structuring investigations around Islamisation and   democracy. 
 
4. Methods 
To establish a data-set of shari’a regulations in Indonesia, we began with records from the 
Ministry of Home affairs (MoHa) which, in theory, is mandated to archive all local regulations. 
In practice, data available at the MoHa are incomplete due to a time-lag between the adop- 
tion of local regulations by sub-national jurisdictions and their reporting to the national 
government as well as the weak capacity of the MoHa. Many local regulations do not get 
reported at all. an increasing number of jurisdictions list the local regulations they adopt 
on their internet website, so to verify and amend the data obtained from the MoHa, we 
checked the website of every jurisdiction in Indonesia. We also used existing compilations 
of religious regulations collected by watchdog organisations and journalists and conducted 
systematic searches in national and local newspaper archives. Finally, we conducted several 
dozen interviews with government officials, civil society organisations, and Islamist activists 
on the ground in Indonesia between 2005 and   2014. 
after reading the text of each regulation, we classified it by subject matter into one of 10 subgroups, 
namely: 
(1) Collection of religious alms (Zakat, Infaq, and Shadaqah) 
(2) Promotion of Islamic knowledge and skills through Islamic education 
(3) Islamic finance (the prohibition of usury) 
(4) Propagation of„proper faith‟and prohibition of Islamic sects deemed unorthodox 
(5) dress codes 
(6) Other religious regulations pertaining to Islamic teachings such as mandating 
Qur‟an-reading tests for political candidates 
(7) Prohibition of gambling 
(8) Prohibition of the consumption of alcohol 
(9) Prohibition of prostitution 
(10) Prohibition of unspecified „sins‟19 
Since local governments outside of aceh province are not technically permitted to issue 
religious laws, as mentioned above, the classification of individual regulations as shari’a was 
not always straightforward. The first seven of the content groups are derived exclusively 
from Islamic teaching and can confidently be said to mirror shari’a laws. laws relating to 
prostitution and alcohol, on the other hand, could be regarded as public order laws, intended to 
reduce violence and other social harms associated with commercial sex or alcohol abuse. 
regulations that have clear public health goals, for example those decreeing the use of 
condoms in commercial sex, were not included in our database. Other local regulations, 
however, attempt to prohibit prostitution and the consumption of alcohol outright. These 
regulations deviate from national law – the production, sale, and consumption of alcohol is 
legal in Indonesia, as is the sale of sex (although pimping is prohibited). regulations prohib- 
iting these behaviours (rather than restricting and moderating them) tend to be moralising in 
intent, and some of them also include scriptural language. They reflect a climate of social 
conservatism consistent with the passage of the types of shari’a regulations mentioned 
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above. We have therefore included them in the database of shari’a legislation, but have 
performed analysis with and without these two  categories. 
In order to align the content of different types of regulations with our proposed frame- 
work, we further categorised the shari’a regulations we collected in terms of their potential 
appeal to different constituencies. We established three  categories: 
• regulations that appeal primarily to local governments and are most likely to be exclu- 
sively supply driven. The only regulations falling in to this category are those that govern 
the collection of religious alms. These bring cash legitimately into the coffers of the local 
government, but impose taxes on Muslim citizens and, arguably, are thus unpopular 
with the electorate. 
• Shari’a regulations that increase patronage opportunities and allow local government 
heads to expand local networks of influence. These include the promotion of knowledge 
through Islamic education, obliging children and sometimes adults to attend private 
Islamic schools to improve their Qur‟an reading skills. Such regulations often introduce 
elaborate payment schemes for Qur‟an reading teachers, who are potentially influential 
vote-brokers in local politics. religious regulations on strengthening Islamic education 
can therefore be seen as a way to put social cosmetics on patronage politics.20 rules 
regulating finance to ensure compliance with Islam‟s prohibition of usury create oppor- 
tunities to channel the public budget through certain banks and financial institutions. 
These present clear opportunities to dole out favours to key individuals in the local 
economy. We also placed shari’a regulations prohibiting prostitution, gambling, and 
alcohol into this category, because of the well-established practice of allowing Islamic- 
themed vigilante groups to collect protection money from those violating these rules.21 
These groups are also potentially important in campaigning and getting the vote out, 
come Election day. 
• Shari’a regulations designed to appeal directly to the electorate. These measures have 
no instrumental value other than boost the Islamic credentials of the local governments 
that adopt them. The regulations in this group include those on dress codes (such as 
obliging women to cover their heads), those that prohibit Islamic sects seen as devi- 
ant, and those that promote public expression of religion such as the very popular 
and well-attended Koran-reading competitions. also included in this category is the 
generalised, non-specific prohibition of „sin‟. 
We jointly developed proposed classifications, focusing initially on the primary benefits to 
district heads, and discussed them with scholars, journalists, and other observers of 
Indonesian politics until consensus was reached. Following comments from reviewers, we 
expressed these clusters in terms of the constituencies they were designed to appeal to, 
since it is through these constituencies that benefits accrue to   politicians. 
We recognise that there is a high degree of subjectivity in these classifications, not least 
because there is some overlap among these categories. In aceh, for example, a formal, state- 
funded„shari’a police‟enforces some of the„reputation-enhancing‟laws such as dress codes. 
The very existence of this additional workforce in itself creates patronage opportunities, and 
more are created in the exercise of their duties. 
In discussing categorisation, we tried to focus on identifying the constituency for whose 
intended benefit the regulation is primarily proposed. The shari’a police do not themselves 
carry much weight with the electorate. In this case, the patronage opportunity is a by-product 
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of a regulation whose primary political aim is more likely to be the alignment of the image 
of a politician as a pious Muslim with the supposed preferences of the electorate. In other 
words, by enacting such regulations, local legislators are intending primarily to appeal 
directly to voters, not to interest groups. 
In order to investigate variations in the geographical distribution of regulations, we cre- 
ated a binary variable reflecting historical links with Islamist activism. The provinces of aceh, 
West Sumatra, West Java, Banten, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi, which all rebelled 
against the republic of Indonesia under the banner of Islam at some point in the twentieth 
century, score positive for this variable. 
The electoral cycle for the top executive government posts in Indonesia runs in five-year 
terms, with each person eligible to serve up to two terms as president, governor, or district 
head. To investigate temporal variations in the passage of shari’a regulations, we further 
divided each cycle into two periods of 2.5 years, giving a possible political life of four periods. 
Two of these immediately follow election or re-election, one covers the time when a first- 
time district head is likely to be campaigning for re-election, and one, the final 2.5 year period 
of a possible 10 years in a given office, covers the period in which the incumbent faces 
mandatory retirement from the post. 
The proposed framework includes an analysis of the implementation status of the various 
regulations. We were unable to obtain these data systematically for all regulations and all 
areas. However, we did collect qualitative data in numerous in-depth interviews with gov- 
ernment officials, civil society organisations, and Islamists in the capital and districts in South 
Sulawesi and West Java province.22 Based on these data, we present some preliminary 
thoughts about the likely validity of our hypotheses relating to    implementation. 
data were initially entered and coded in Excel, then exported to Stata 11 for analysis. The 
primary unit of analysis was the regulation. In other words, each separate regulation carried 
the same weight in the analysis, regardless of whether or not they were passed by the same 
individual. 
Maps were made using shape files describing provincial and district boundaries extant 
in 2012, the end of the period under review. Statistical significance was tested using a two- 
sided chi squared distribution. results reported as „significantly different‟ have p ≤ .05. 
 
5. Results 
Overall, we collected and classified 442 local shari’a regulations enacted between 1999 and 
2012. Of these, two-thirds (292, 65.9%) were enacted in rural districts,23 a quarter (109, 24.6%) 
in municipalities, and the remainder (42, 9.5%) by provincial governments. Most took the 
form of peraturan daerah or local regulations, meaning they passed through the local legis- 
lature. Some 16% were regulations issued as executive orders by the head of the local gov- 
ernment. Overall, 254 individual politicians passed religious regulations at the provincial or 
district level in Indonesia between 2001 and  2012. 
We present the remainder of the results in accordance with the framework, looking at 
the distribution of regulations across different areas of content, across the electoral cycle, 
across geographical areas. We then look at the interaction between these areas. 
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Table 2. Number and distribution of shari’a regulations passed in indonesia, 1999–2012, by content, 
for historically islamic provinces and other provinces. 
 
 Former Islamic rebellion no Islamic rebellion Total* 
n (%) n (%) n (%) 
religious alms 40 (15) 28 (16) 68 (15) 
islamic education 54 (20) 16 (9) 70 (16) 
Shari’a finance 22 (8) 21 (12) 43 (10) 
Prohibits sects 21 (8) 9 (5) 30 (7) 
dress codes 24 (9) 0 24 (5) 
Public display of islamic knowledge 21 (8) 4 (2) 25 (7) 
Prohibits alcohol 44 (17) 49 (28) 93 (21) 
Prohibits prostitution 13 (5) 36 (21) 49 (11) 
Prohibits gambling 4 (2) 0 4 (1) 
Prohibits „sin‟ 24 (9) 12 (7) 36 (8) 
ToTal 267 (100) 175 (100) 442 (100) 
*Percentages may not add to 100 because of 
rounding. 
   
 
Content 
Over a fifth of all regulations restricted the sale or consumption of alcohol – the single most 
common area for regulation. The promotion of Islamic education came next at 16%, with 
the collection of religious alms at 15%. (details can be seen in Table 2.) Collapsing regulations 
into categories which try to capture their primary potential beneficiaries, we find that a 
majority of regulations provide patronage opportunities for the benefit of special interest 
groups – fully 57% of the total. a further 26% are designed to appeal primarily to voters by 
showcasing the piety of local government, while the remaining 15% impose taxes, appealing 
only to the government itself. 
 
Timing 
Overall, 68% of the shari’a regulations in our database were passed during a governor or 
district-head‟s first term in office. This is not unexpected since some politicians were voted 
out of office or gaoled for corruption after just one term. among both first- and second-term 
regulations, a minority (46% and 47% respectively) were passed in the first half of the period. 
The single most active period for passing shari’a regulations was in the second half of the 
first term, when the incumbent was likely to be seeking  re-election. 
 
The geographical expression of history 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of shari’a regulations across Indonesia. aceh, which is unique 
among Indonesian provinces in being permitted to pass formal shari’a laws, accounted for 
over a third of all religious regulations passed at the provincial level  (15/41). 
With the exception of East Java, all the provinces that passed 20 or more shari’a regulations 
at the provincial and district levels combined over the period under review were sites of 
Islamist-identified rebellions against the national government in Jakarta during the early 
decades of the republic of Indonesia.24 Those provinces accounted for 23% (115/497) of all 
districts and municipalities in Indonesia at the start of 2012, the final year covered by this 
study. In terms of the shari’a regulations passed, however, they accounted for fully  60%. 
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Table 3. Number and distribution of shari’a regulations passed in indonesia, 1999–2012, by 
primary potential beneficiaries, for historically islamic provinces and other provinces. 
 
Primary political beneficiary 
of regulation 
      Former Islamic rebellion  no Islamic rebellion  Total   
n (%) n (%) n (%) 
 
 
Government 40 (15) 28 (16) 68 (15) 
interest groups 137 (51) 122 (70)* 259 (57) 
Voters 90 (34) 25 (14)* 115 (26) 
 
 
*difference is statistically significant at the p < .000 level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of shari’a regulations enacted in indonesia at the provincial or district level 
between 1999 and 2012, by province. 
 
Interaction between content and history 
as Table 2 shows, the distribution of the content of regulations varies by a region‟s history. 
In areas that have not historically had links with Islamist movements, 49% of all of the reg- 
ulations in the database relate to alcohol and prostitution, compared with just 22% in more 
historically Islamic provinces (p < .000). If these more generalised„morality-based‟regulations 
are excluded from the analysis, then the concentration of shari’a regulations in historically 
Islamic areas rises to 70%. 
When these groups are collapsed by primary potential beneficiary or„target audience‟ as 
in Table 3, we see a clear pattern linking history and content. regulations that only meet the 
interests of government are evenly distributed. Shari’a regulations intended to appeal 
directly to voters were more than twice as likely to be passed by provinces and districts with 
a strong history of Islamic political organisation, compared with historically less 
Islamist areas. Some 34% of regulations passed in provinces that were Islamist strongholds 
promoted piety, compared with just 14% of those on other areas ( p < .000). Fully 70% of the 
regulations passed in less Islamist areas could be classified as providing patronage 
opportunities to potential vote-brokers. 
Within those regulations providing patronage opportunities, there were strong regional 
variations in actual content. In areas with a history of Islamic rebellion, fully 56% of regula- 
tions potentially benefiting interest groups mandated Islamic teaching or finance, while only a 
minority, 44%, were morality-based. In other areas of Indonesia, however, 70% of all reg- 
ulations of potential benefit to interest groups dealt with alcohol or   prostitution. 
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Interaction between content and timing 
In looking at the interactions between the content and timing of laws, we have grouped the 
first half of the first and second terms to represent all periods in which a district was headed 
by someone recently elected or re-elected. The second half of the first term represents the 
campaigning period, when an incumbent is likely to have their eyes on the chance of re-elec- 
tion. The second half of the second term represents the legacy period, during which a can- 
didate is coming to end of his or her popular mandate, and is not able to run again for the 
same post. 
regulations that carried patronage opportunities were the majority during every part of 
the election cycle, and did not differ significantly between electoral periods. However the 
regulations on the collection of religious alms that generate revenue at the expense of 
Muslim members of the electorate were significantly less likely to be passed during the 
campaigning cycle than at other times (p = .01). In fact, they were most likely to be passed 
in a local government head‟s final term in office, when re-election to the post was no longer 
possible, as shown in Figure 2. 
regulations thought to appeal to voters by highlighting a leader‟s image as a pious per- 
son, on the other hand, were more than twice as likely to be passed in the campaign cycle 
compared with times when the incumbent could not be re-elected (p = .02). 
 
Interaction between content, timing, and history 
The interactions between content and timing were accentuated when a region‟s history was 
also taken into account, as Figure 3 shows. 
In historically less Islamist areas, not a single regulation promoting a leader‟s credentials 
as a good Muslim was passed when that leader was unable to seek re-election, while in 
provinces with a history of Islamic political engagement, over a quarter of regulations passed in 
this„legacy‟ period were largely signals of piety, with only limited monetary or  patronage 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage distribution of shari’a regulations passed in indonesia 1999–2012, by 
primary potential beneficiary and time in election  cycle. 
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Figure 3. Percentage distribution of shari’a regulations passed in indonesia 1999–2012, by 
primary potential beneficiary, time in election cycle, and provincial history of islamist  
rebellion. 
 
benefit. during campaign periods, incumbents in former Islamist rebel strongholds were 
especially likely to pass regulations that reflected well on their religious   sensibilities. 
The pattern remains the same, and the differences in distribution of regulations by broad 
potential political benefit remain statistically significant if regulations prohibiting prostitution 
and alcohol are excluded from the analysis (data not  shown). 
 
Qualitative evidence: influence and  implementation 
In-depth interviews with Islamist groups suggest that they see themselves as the motivating 
actors for the passage of shari’a regulations. They use campaign periods as a time to exert 
leverage over incumbents to pass laws, while extracting promises from other candidates 
about future implementation. They are not always  successful. 
In the staunchly Muslim West Java district of Cianjur, Islamist activists felt betrayed after 
the 2006 elections in which the incumbent, who had himself passed nine shari’a laws, was 
defeated. Though the victorious candidate was backed by the Prosperous Justice Party, the 
most Islamist of all of Indonesia‟s mainstream parties, he did not follow through on an Islamist 
agenda, passing no new shari’a regulations during the period of this study.25 Chep Hernawan, 
the leader of Cianjur‟s largest Islamist group, GarIS, said in an interview: „The current 
gov- ernment are assholes [brengsek]. If it is just us [fighting for Islam] it is difficult if the 
govern- ment is not pro-active‟.26 
Politicians, for their part, are relatively open about using shari’a regulations as an instru- 
ment to expand networks among interest groups. an example comes from Patabai Pabokori, 
who was appointed district head of Bulukumba in the conservative Muslim province of South 
Sulawesi during the new Order period. at the time, local leaders faced no electoral incentives to  
please  citizens,  and  Pabokori  showed  no  evidence  of  strong  religious  conviction. In 
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democratising Indonesia, however, Pabokori announced plans to turn Bulukumba into a 
„warehouse [gudang] of people knowing the Qur‟an by heart‟. He paid uS$1500 (Idr 15 
million) to every pesantren that committed to teaching students to know the Qur‟an by heart 
(tahfiz),27 and published photographs that show him distributing money to religious notables in 
Bulukumba district.28 
Besides delivering to Islamic interest groups, this religious fervour was apparently 
designed to appeal to voters, through successive electoral cycles. Those who followed the 
„Crash Programme in religiosity‟[Crash Program Keagamaan] were given„degrees‟. 
However the imposition of a religious tax to fund a mosque-building programme 
undermined that goal. The tax, imposed selectively on bureaucrats for practical reasons, 
led to a stream of complaints to a South Sulawesi newspaper. One local bureaucrat railed 
that if his salary was cut each month for infaq, sadaqah, and zakat payments, which were 
then allegedly used for mosque projects run by the district head, he at least would expect 
these mosques to be really built. So far, the sender informed the newspaper, not much 
had happened in that respect.29 
local Islamist activists in Bulukumba reinforced the fact that the regulations designed to 
woo voters were not always implemented in practice. ahmad Kadir, the head of the local 
Islamist group Forum Pembela Islam, complained in an interview in 2012: 
The local government is not serious about enforcing the shari’a regulations which it has adopted 
in past years. I come to the district head office every week to remind the district head of these 
regulations. last year we gave [the district head] an ultimatum that we would take the enforce- 
ment into our own hands.30 
In an interview, Patabai Pabokori inferred that the passage of shari’a regulations had also 
allowed him to extend his influence in non-religious circles: „The money from zakat [collec- 
tion] is for the poor. There are many thugs among poor people. If you give them money, 
then they keep quiet‟. He went on to say that crime levels in Bulukumba district had dropped 
after the adoption of shari’a regulations, because petty criminals and thugs were effectively 
taken on to the payroll of the district  government.31 
 
6. Discussion: the ‘Alignment of Interest’ framework in the 
Indonesian context 
Here, we attempt to fit the Indonesia data to our proposed framework, comparing the results 
with expectations. 
 
Pattern 1: supply side motivation; religious ideology 
The pattern expected for situations in which religious ideology is an important motivator 
among politicians for the passage of shari’a laws in a country is: even distribution of shari’a 
laws across content type, geography, and time (though with a possible peak soon after first 
election) and strong implementation. Based on the majority of the literature examining 
Islamist engagement in Indonesian politics, we expected to find little evidence of this pattern. 
That has been the case. There are marked variations in the content, timing, and geograph- 
ical distribution of the passage of shari’a laws across Indonesia. Qualitative evidence suggests 
that strong implementation of the laws that do get passed is not the norm. Our analysis 
This is the accepted version of an article published online by Taylor and Francis in Third World Quarterly on 29 
July 2016. Published version available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2016.1206453  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22731/  
  
14 
 
 
gives little indication that„Extremism Spreads across Indonesian Penal Code‟type narratives 
reflect reality; we believe this accords with most scholarship on the  subject. 
 
Pattern 2: demand side motivation; direct appeal to voters 
The pattern expected for situations in which politicians pass regulations in large part as a 
way of appealing to individual voters is: content that reflects well on a candidate, very high 
variability across the political cycle, and very high variability between geographic areas. We 
expect implementation to be more pronounced for first term administration. Given the high 
geographic diversity of Indonesia, the personality-driven nature of campaigns and very high 
voter participation in local elections, we would expect this pattern to be rather pronounced in 
Indonesia. 
again, our findings accord with this expectation. In areas where Islam is deeply culturally 
and politically embedded and voters may be expected to have a preference for a visibly 
pious leader, regulations that indicate piety but have little other instrumental value were 
passed very much more commonly than they were in other areas of Indonesia, both in 
absolute numbers and as a proportion of all shari’a regulations passed. They were also passed 
most actively in the second half of the first term in office, a time at which most incumbents 
are positioning themselves for re-election. The limited qualitative data available suggest 
that leaders who pass regulations designed to heighten their appeal to voters often do little to 
enforce them. In our framework, we would expect to see greater efforts at enforcement in 
the first term in office, be we do not have enough systematic evidence either to support or 
refute this. This underscores the need for more rigorous collection of data related to the 
implementation of local regulations. 
In areas that have less deeply rooted links with Islamist movements, regulations designed 
to appeal directly to the electorate were less commonly passed. While that was in line with 
our proposed framework, we would have expected to see those supposedly populist regu- 
lations that were passed peak in the campaign period. This was not the case. We note, how- 
ever, that not a single second-term incumbent facing retirement from the post of district 
head in a less historically Islamist area passed any regulation which had no instrumental 
value other than to enhance a reputation for religious  piety. 
 
Pattern 3: demand side motivation; appeal to power brokers 
Many scholars have presented evidence of the deeply transactional nature of Indonesian 
democracy, and in particular the importance of power brokers and interest groups in influ- 
encing voters at the local level. In the Indonesian context we would thus expect strong 
evidence of this third pattern, in which the content of the regulations passed confer patron- 
age opportunities on interest groups, usually by providing mechanisms for them to raise 
money. We would expect the particular nature of the patronage opportunities, though not 
necessarily their extent, to vary geographically to accord with culturally-embedded com- 
mitment to Islam. However because patronage relationships are built and maintained over 
time, we would expect limited variation across the electoral cycle. Implementation is 
expected to be high in this pattern. 
Once again, our findings largely concur with the framework. In Indonesia, regulations 
conferring patronage opportunities are by far the most commonly passed of all the subsets 
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of shari’a regulations, regardless of the political and cultural history of the area. However, 
there is geographical variation within those patronage regulations. In historical Islamist 
strongholds, they are more likely to focus on Islamic teaching, which plays to the interests 
of the religious leaders who are potentially powerful locally. In other parts of the country, 
most regulations relate to prostitution and alcohol, domains over which vigilante groups of 
many religious and political persuasions hold sway. In terms of timing, there is, as expected, 
less cyclical variation in the passage of these types of regulations – they make up the majority 
of regulations passed in every  period. 
Our framework predicted that these regulations should be implemented in order to 
deliver patronage, but qualitative evidence point to an alternative view. requirements for 
religious education and shari’a finance only benefit interest groups when they are enforced 
by the local government, and in those cases, we would continue to expect strong imple- 
mentation. However, regulations prohibiting prostitution or restricting alcohol in fact benefit 
vigilante-style interests groups precisely when they are not enforced by the local govern- 
ment. This allows vigilante groups to take the law into their own hands, as threatened by 
Forum Pembela Islam in Bulukumba. In other words, it is this lax enforcement by the 
local government that provides the opportunity for protection rackets. 
We believe that the implementation parameter of our proposed framework may need 
revision as more data become available and it can be more thoroughly validated. Overall, 
however, we conclude that the framework fits well with the Indonesian data. Careful analysis of 
the content, timing, geographic distribution, and to a lesser extent implementation of 
shari’a regulations passed between 1999 and 2012 yields the following picture: a nation in 
which the passage of shari’a regulations serves first the demands of a clientelistic electoral 
system (Pattern 3), then the desire of politicians to appeal directly to the electorate (Pattern 
2). The passage of shari’a laws in Indonesia provides very little evidence of an 
ideological- ly-driven Islamising agenda among politicians (Pattern 1). This general picture 
conforms well to the consensus among scholars of Indonesia as to the relationship between 
democracy and political Islam in the country. With caution, then, we consider the proposed 
framework validated for the Indonesian case. 
 
Limitations 
Our caution derives in part from the limitations of our data. Firstly, we had very little data 
with which we could validate the parameter relating to implementation. Secondly, the divi- 
sion of the electoral cycle into two and a half year periods gives at best a crude indication 
of the alignment of the passage of regulations with the political exigencies of the day. Further, 
we recognise that the majority of regulations (some 85% of those in our database) pass 
through the local parliament. Parliamentarians and political parties may therefore also have 
been instrumental in both initiating regulation and in reaping any electoral rewards that it 
brought, and the electoral cycle of the parliament in Indonesia does not match that of the 
district head. during the period under review, however, party affiliations generally remained 
weak in local legislatures, and the political agenda was set by the executive in the vast 
majority of localities.32 We note also that our binary definition of historical association with 
Islamist rebellion provides only a blunt proxy for the strength of Islamic convictions and thus 
the expected preferences of voters in local cultural  contexts. 
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Perhaps the most important potential weakness of our work is the classification of content as 
potentially appealing primarily to different constituencies. Though we consulted as widely as 
possible, we acknowledge that the process was highly subjective, and our classifications 
may be seen as overly cynical. Certainly, they do not reflect the true complexity, in which 
categories are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason, for example, that a regulation may 
not be enacted out of personal conviction or party ideology, and simultaneously serve the 
interests of power brokers while also appealing directly to the electorate. While limited 
existing research broadly confirms our attributions,33 more careful ethnographic research 
into how religious regulations are proposed, negotiated, and implemented would likely 
allow for a more nuanced attribution of beneficiaries and prospective benefits for different 
types of law. We hope that others who collect similar data prospectively will be able to 
develop more sensitive  categorisations. 
We feel it important to stress that the categorisations refer to the potential appeal of dif- 
ferent types of regulations to different constituencies. no rigorous analysis has been under- 
taken to evaluate the actual relationship between the passage of shari’a laws and electoral 
outcomes in Indonesia. We were unable to perform this analysis using the current database 
because it is limited to the universe of governors and district heads who had ever passed 
any shari’a law. To investigate the success of their actions as an electoral strategy in Indonesia, 
and to compare the relative success of strategies appealing directly to voters with those 
conferring patronage opportunities, we would need to compare their chance of re-election 
with those who had never passed any shari’a law. This work is now underway, and will be 
reported separately. 
In the interim, we encourage scholars with an interest in the relationship between the 
electoral process and the passage of shari’a laws to consider using the framework we propose 
to investigate interactions between politics and religious laws in other Muslim-majority 
democracies. 
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2. Haqqani and Fradkin, “Going Back to the Origins”; yavuz , Turkey; Zaman, “Pakistan.” 
3. Barfield, Afghanistan; Brown, Egypt; Harnischfeger, Democratisation and Islamic Law; 
longley, “The High Water Mark”;  roy, Islam;  Wiktorowicz, Islamic. 
4. Brinkley Messick described Islamic law as a„total discourse‟that includes religious, legal, 
moral, and economic rules and regulations. See Messick, The Calligraphic State, 3. Islamic law 
has only been codified in the context of colonial transformations of Muslim countries. See Hallaq, 
Shari’a between Past and Present, 371–499. Therefore, a complete and mutually agreed upon 
canon of „Islamic law‟ does not exist. 
5. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen–Politician linkages,” 8. 
6. rural districts and municipalities share the third level of the administrative hierarchy in 
Indonesia after the national and provincial governments. They are headed by district heads 
and mayors, respectively. To avoid repetition, we use the term„district‟and„district head‟to cover 
all units and leaders at this level unless there are developments distinctive to municipalities. 
7. Badan Pusat Statistik, Kewarganegaraan. 
8. local regulations are adopted by the local government head together with the local parliament 
while executive orders are issued by the local government head alone. For brevity‟s sake we 
refer to both legal instruments as „local regulations‟ only. 
9. anwar, Developing Social Fiqh; Beatty, A Shadow has Fallen; nakamura, Islam and 
Democracy in Indonesia, 28. 
10. Onishi, “Extremism Spreads across Indonesian Penal Code.” 
11. Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties.” 
12. Bush, “regional Sharia regulations.” 
13. Crouch, “Stretching the Scope.” 
14. Buehler, “The rise of Shari‟a By-laws.” 
15. Buehler and Tan, “Party–Candidate relationships.” 
16. Wilson, “Morality racketeering.” 
17. rosser et al., “leaders, Elites and Coalitions”;  Erb and Sulistiyanto, Deepening. 
18. aspinall and Sukmajati, Politik. 
19. In our database, 36 regulations simply refer to prohibiting„sins‟ without specifying what these 
are. 
20. Buehler, “The rise of Shari‟a By-laws.” 
21. Wilson, “Morality racketeering.” 
22. These two provinces have adopted the highest number of shari’a regulations in Eastern 
Indonesia and Java respectively. 
23. as mentioned above,„districts‟is the official term used for rural jurisdictions, while„municipalities‟ 
denote urban areas. The urbanisation of Indonesia, especially on the main island Java, has 
turned many „rural‟ districts into semi-urban landscapes in recent years. 
24. For an account of why shari’a regulations have spread to East Java, see Turmudi, “Patronage, 
aliran and Islamic Ideologies,” 38–60. 
25. Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh was first elected in 2006, and re-elected in 2011. His administration had 
passed no shari'a regulation up until the end of our data collection in 2012. 
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29. Tribun Timur, PS Daerah, 17. 
30. Buehler, The Politics of Shari’a Law, 249. 
31. Patabai Pabokori, personal communication, 14 September 2006. 
32. Ibrahim et al., Parlemen. 
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